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Luc Paquin

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Central Questions

Most positions that may be taken with regards to any of the following questions are endorsed by one or another notable philosopher. It often is difficult to frame the questions in a non-controversial manner.

Being, Existence and Reality

The nature of Being is a perennial topic in metaphysics. For instance, Parmenides taught that reality is a single unchanging Being. The twentieth century philosopher Heidegger thought previous philosophers had lost sight of the question of Being (qua Being) in favour of the questions of beings (existing things), and that a return to the Parmenidean approach was needed. An ontological catalogue is an attempt to list the fundamental constituents of reality. The question of whether or not existence is a predicate has been discussed since the Early Modern period, not the least, in relation to the ontological argument for the existence of God. Existence, that something is, has been contrasted with essence, the question of what something is. Reflections on the nature of the connection and distinction between existence and essence dates back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and later, found one of its most influential interpretations in the ontology of the eleventh century metaphysician Avicenna (Ibn Sina). Since existence without essence seems blank, it is associated with nothingness by philosophers such as Hegel.

Luc Paquin

Origins and Nature of Metaphysics

Although the word “metaphysics” goes back to Aristotelian philosophy, Plato himself credited earlier philosophers with dealing with metaphysical questions. The first known philosopher, according to Aristotle, is Thales of Miletus, who taught that all things derive from a single first cause or Arche.

Metaphysics as a discipline was a central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education even before the age of Aristotle, who considered it “the Queen of Sciences.” Its issues were considered no less important than the other main formal subjects of physical science, medicine, mathematics, poetics and music. Since the beginning of modern philosophy during the seventeenth century, problems that were not originally considered within the bounds of metaphysics have been added to its purview, while other problems considered metaphysical for centuries are now typically subjects of their own separate regions in philosophy, such as philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science.

Numbers

Commentary from Sir William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870, p. 620).

  • Pythagoras resembled greatly the philosophers of what is termed the Ionic school, who undertook to solve by means of a single primordial principle the vague problem of the origin and constitution of the universe as a whole. But, as did Anaximander, he abandoned the physical hypotheses of Thales and Anaximenes, and passed from the province of physics to that of metaphysics, and his predilection for mathematical studies led him to trace the origin of all things to number, this theory being suggested, or at all events confirmed, by the observation of various numerical relations, or analogies to them, in the phenomena of the universe. “Since of all things numbers are by nature the first, in numbers they (the Pythagoreans) thought they perceived many analogies to things that exist and are produced, more than in fire, and earth, and Avater; as that a certain affection of numbers was justice; a certain other affection, soul and intellect; another, opportunity; and of the rest, so to say, each in like manner; and moreover, seeing the affections and ratios of what pertains to harmony to consist in numbers, since other things seemed in their entire nature to be formed in the likeness of numbers, and in all nature numbers are the first, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things”.
  • Brandis, who traces in the notices that remain more than one system, developed by different Pythagoreans, according as they recognised in numbers the inherent basis of things, or only the patterns of them, considers that all started from the common conviction that it was in numbers and their relations that they were to find the absolutely certain principles of knowledge, and of the objects of it, and accordingly regarded the principles of numbers as the absolute principles of things; keeping true to the common maxim of the ancient philosophy, that like takes cognisance of like. Aristotle states the fundamental maxim of the Pythagoreans in various forms.

Luc Paquin

Etymology

The word “metaphysics” derives from the Greek words µet? (metá, “beyond”, “upon” or “after”) and physiká. It was first used as the title for several of Aristotle’s works, because they were usually anthologized after the works on physics in complete editions. The prefix meta- (“after”) indicates that these works come “after” the chapters on physics. However, Aristotle himself did not call the subject of these books “Metaphysics”: he referred to it as “first philosophy.” The editor of Aristotle’s works, Andronicus of Rhodes, is thought to have placed the books on first philosophy right after another work, Physics, and called them “ta meta ta physika biblia” or “the books that come after the [books on] physics”. This was misread by Latin scholiasts, who thought it meant “the science of what is beyond the physical”.

However, once the name was given, the commentators sought to find intrinsic reasons for its appropriateness. For instance, it was understood to mean “the science of the world beyond nature” (physis in Greek), that is, the science of the immaterial. Again, it was understood to refer to the chronological or pedagogical order among our philosophical studies, so that the “metaphysical sciences” would mean “those that we study after having mastered the sciences that deal with the physical world” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus, V, 1).

There is a widespread use of the term in current popular literature which replicates this understanding, i.e. that the metaphysical equates to the non-physical: thus, “metaphysical healing” means healing by means of remedies that are not physical.

Luc Paquin

Metaphysics is a traditional branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it, although the term is not easily defined. Traditionally, metaphysics attempts to answer two basic questions in the broadest possible terms:

  • Ultimately, what is there?
  • What is it like?

A person who studies metaphysics is called a metaphysicist or a metaphysician. The metaphysician attempts to clarify the fundamental notions by which people understand the world, e.g., existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility. A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they relate to each other. Another central branch of metaphysics is cosmology, the study of the origin, fundamental structure, nature, and dynamics of the universe. Some include epistemology as another central focus of metaphysics, but others question this.

Prior to the modern history of science, scientific questions were addressed as a part of metaphysics known as natural philosophy. Originally, the term “science” (Latin scientia) simply meant “knowledge”. The scientific method, however, transformed natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment unlike the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be called “science” to distinguish it from philosophy. Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence. Some philosophers of science, such as the neo-positivists, say that natural science rejects the study of metaphysics, while other philosophers of science strongly disagree.

Luc Paquin

Criticisms

Williams’ Argument In Detail

In addition to the preceding two arguments against the cogito, other arguments have been advanced by Bernard Williams. He claims, for example, that what we are dealing with when we talk of thought, or when we say “I am thinking,” is something conceivable from a third-person perspective; namely objective “thought-events” in the former case, and an objective thinker in the latter.

Williams provides a meticulous and exhaustive examination of this objection. He argues, first, that it is impossible to make sense of “there is thinking” without relativizing it to something. However, this something cannot be Cartesian egos, because it is impossible to differentiate objectively between things just on the basis of the pure content of consciousness.

The obvious problem is that, through introspection, or our experience of consciousness, we have no way of moving to conclude the existence of any third-personal fact, to conceive of which would require something above and beyond just the purely subjective contents of the mind.

Søren Kierkegaard’s Critique

The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard provided a critical response to the cogito. Kierkegaard argues that the cogito already presupposes the existence of “I”, and therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial. Kierkegaard’s argument can be made clearer if one extracts the premise “I think” into two further premises:

  • “x” thinks
  • I am that “x”
  • Therefore I think
  • Therefore I am

Where “x” is used as a placeholder in order to disambiguate the “I” from the thinking thing.

Here, the cogito has already assumed the “I”‘s existence as that which thinks. For Kierkegaard, Descartes is merely “developing the content of a concept”, namely that the “I”, which already exists, thinks.

Kierkegaard argues that the value of the cogito is not its logical argument, but its psychological appeal: a thought must have something that exists to think the thought. It is psychologically difficult to think “I do not exist”. But as Kierkegaard argues, the proper logical flow of argument is that existence is already assumed or presupposed in order for thinking to occur, not that existence is concluded from that thinking.

John Macmurray’s Form of the Personal

The Scottish philosopher John Macmurray rejects the cogito outright in order to place action at the center of a philosophical system he entitles the Form of the Personal. “We must reject this, both as standpoint and as method. If this be philosophy, then philosophy is a bubble floating in an atmosphere of unreality.” The reliance on thought creates an irreconcilable dualism between thought and action in which the unity of experience is lost. Thus dissolving the integrity of our selves, and destroying any connection with reality. In order to formulate a more adequate cogito, Macmurray proposes the substitution of “I do” for “I think”. Ultimately leading to a belief in God as an agent to whom all persons stand in relation.
Skepticism

Many philosophical skeptics and particularly radical skeptics would say that indubitable knowledge does not exist, is impossible, or has not been found yet, and would apply this criticism to the assertion that the “cogito” is beyond doubt.

Luc Paquin

Criticisms

There have been a number of criticisms of the argument. One concerns the nature of the step from “I am thinking” to “I exist.” The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: “Whatever has the property of thinking, exists”, a premise Descartes did not justify. In fact, he conceded that there would indeed be an extra premise needed, but denied that the cogito is a syllogism (see below).

To argue that the cogito is not a syllogism, one may call it self-evident that “Whatever has the property of thinking, exists”. In plain English, it seems incoherent to actually doubt that one exists and is doubting. Strict skeptics maintain that only the property of ‘thinking’ is indubitably a property of the meditator (presumably, they imagine it possible that a thing thinks but does not exist). This countercriticism is similar to the ideas of Jaakko Hintikka, who offers a nonsyllogistic interpretation of cogito ergo sum. He claimed that one simply cannot doubt the proposition “I exist”. To be mistaken about the proposition would mean something impossible: I do not exist, but I am still wrong.

Perhaps a more relevant contention is whether the “I” to which Descartes refers is justified. In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. Apparently, the first scholar who raised the problem was Pierre Gassendi. He “points out that recognition that one has a set of thoughts does not imply that one is a particular thinker or another. Were we to move from the observation that there is thinking occurring to the attribution of this thinking to a particular agent, we would simply assume what we set out to prove, namely, that there exists a particular person endowed with the capacity for thought”. In other words, “the only claim that is indubitable here is the agent-independent claim that there is cognitive activity present”. The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: “thinking is occurring.” That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the “I,” is more than the cogito can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche criticized the phrase in that it presupposes that there is an “I”, that there is such an activity as “thinking”, and that “I” know what “thinking” is. He suggested a more appropriate phrase would be “it thinks.” In other words, the “I” in “I think” could be similar to the “It” in “It is raining.” David Hume claims that the philosophers who argue for a self that can be found using reason are confusing “similarity” with “identity”. This means that the similarity of our thoughts and the continuity of them in this similarity do not mean that we can identify ourselves as a self but that our thoughts are similar.

Luc Paquin

Predecessors

Although the idea expressed in cogito ergo sum is widely attributed to Descartes, he was not the first to mention it. Plato spoke about the “knowledge of knowledge” (Greek: nóesis noéseos) and Aristotle explains the idea in full length:

  • But if life itself is good and pleasant (…) and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist… (Nicomachean Ethics, 1170a25 ff.)

Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei writes Si […] fallor, sum (“If I am mistaken, I am”) (book XI, 26), and also anticipates modern refutations of the concept. Furthermore, in the Enchiridion Augustine attempts to refute skepticism by stating, “[B]y not positively affirming that they are alive, the skeptics ward off the appearance of error in themselves, yet they do make errors simply by showing themselves alive; one cannot err who is not alive. That we live is therefore not only true, but it is altogether certain as well” (Chapter 7 section 20). Another predecessor was Avicenna’s “Floating Man” thought experiment on human self-awareness and self-consciousness.

The 8th Century Hindu philosopher Adi Shankara wrote in a similar fashion, No one thinks, ‘I am not’, arguing that one’s existence cannot be doubted, as there must be someone there to doubt.

Luc Paquin

Interpretation

The phrase cogito ergo sum is not used in Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy but the term “the cogito” is used to refer to an argument from it. In the Meditations, Descartes phrases the conclusion of the argument as “that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.” (Meditation II)

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt – his argument from the existence of a deceiving god – Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any have survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence, he finds that it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon), one’s belief in their own existence would be secure, for there is no way one could be deceived unless one existed in order to be deceived.

  • But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I, too, do not exist? No. If I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all], then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who deliberately and constantly deceives me. In that case, I, too, undoubtedly exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII 25; CSM II 16-17)

There are three important notes to keep in mind here. First, he claims only the certainty of his own existence from the first-person point of view – he has not proved the existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of the meditations. Second, he does not say that his existence is necessary; he says that if he thinks, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle). Third, this proposition “I am, I exist” is held true not based on a deduction (as mentioned above) or on empirical induction but on the clarity and self-evidence of the proposition. Descartes does not use this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can stand as he works to restore his beliefs. As he puts it:

  • Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable. (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)

According to many Descartes specialists, including Étienne Gilson, the goal of Descartes in establishing this first truth is to demonstrate the capacity of his criterion – the immediate clarity and distinctiveness of self-evident propositions – to establish true and justified propositions despite having adopted a method of generalized doubt. As a consequence of this demonstration, Descartes considers science and mathematics to be justified to the extent that their proposals are established on a similarly immediate clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence that presents itself to the mind. The originality of Descartes’s thinking, therefore, is not so much in expressing the cogito – a feat accomplished by other predecessors, as we shall see – but on using the cogito as demonstrating the most fundamental epistemological principle, that science and mathematics are justified by relying on clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence. Baruch Spinoza in “Principia philosophiae cartesianae” at its Prolegomenon identified “cogito ergo sum” the “ego sum cogitans” (I am a thinking being) as the thinking substance with his ontological interpretation. It can also be considered that Cogito ergo sum is needed before any living being can go further in life”

Luc Paquin

In Descartes’s Writings

Meditations on First Philosophy

In 1641, Descartes published (in Latin) Meditations on first philosophy in which he referred to the proposition, though not explicitly as “cogito ergo sum” in Meditation II:

  • Latin: “… hoc pronuntiatum: ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.”
  • English: “.. this proposition: I am, I exist, whenever it is uttered from me, or conceived by the mind, necessarily is true.”

Principles of Philosophy

In 1644, Descartes published (in Latin) his Principles of Philosophy where the phrase “ego cogito, ergo sum” appears in Part 1, article 7:

  • Latin: “Sic autem rejicientes illa omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam, falsa esse fingentes, facilè quidem, supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos, non habere manus, nec pedes, nec denique ullum corpus, non autem ideò nos qui talia cogitamus nihil esse: repugnat enim ut putemus id quod cogitat eo ipso tempore quo cogitat non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium prima & certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat.”
  • English: “While we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly.”

Descartes’s margin note for the above paragraph is:

  • Latin: “Non posse à nobis dubitari, quin existamus dum dubitamus: at que hoc esse primum quod ordine philosophando cognoscimus.”
  • English: “That we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt, and that this is the first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize in order.”

Other Forms

The proposition is sometimes given as dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum. This fuller form was penned by the eloquent French literary critic, Antoine Léonard Thomas, in an award-winning 1765 essay in praise of Descartes, where it appeared as “Puisque je doute, je pense; puisque je pense, j’existe.” In English, this is “Since I doubt, I think; since I think I exist”; with rearrangement and compaction, “I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am”, or in Latin, “dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum”.

A further expansion, dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum – res cogitans (“… – a thinking thing”) extends the cogito with Descartes’s statement in the subsequent Meditation, “Ego sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam et sentiens …”, or, in English, “I am a thinking (conscious) thing, that is, a being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant of many …”. This has been referred to as “the expanded cogito”.

Luc Paquin

In Descartes’s Writings

Descartes first wrote the phrase in French in his 1637 Discourse on the Method. He referred to it in Latin without explicitly stating the familiar form of the phrase in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy. The earliest written record of the phrase in Latin is in his 1644 Principles of Philosophy, where, in a margin note, he provides a clear explanation of his intent. Fuller forms of the phrase are attributable to other authors.

Discourse on the Method

The phrase first appeared (in French) in Descartes’s 1637 Discourse on the Method in the first paragraph of its fourth part:

  • French: “… Ainsi, à cause que nos sens nous trompent quelquefois, je voulus supposer qu’il n’y avoit aucune chose qui fût telle qu’ils nous la font imaginer; et parce qu’il y a des hommes qui se méprennent en raisonnant, même touchant les plus simples matières de géométrie, et y font des paralogismes, jugeant que j’étois sujet à faillir autant qu’aucun autre, je rejetai comme fausses toutes les raisons que j’avois prises auparavant pour démonstrations; et enfin, considérant que toutes les mêmes pensées que nous avons étant éveillés nous peuvent aussi venir quand nous dormons, sans qu’il y en ait aucune pour lors qui soit vraie, je me résolus de feindre que toutes les choses qui m’étoient jamais entrées en l’esprit n’étoient non plus vraies que les illusions de mes songes. Mais aussitôt après je pris garde que, pendant que je voulois ainsi penser que tout étoit faux, il falloit nécessairement que moi qui le pensois fusse quelque chose; et remarquant que cette vérité, je pense, donc je suis, étoit si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n’étoient pas capables de l’ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvois la recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchois.”
  • English: “… Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am,[c] was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.”

Luc Paquin

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